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KUALITI AHLI LEMBAGA PENGARAH, STRUKTUR PEMILIKAN DAN TAHAP 
PENZAHIRAN SUKARELA OLEH SYARIKAT-SYARIKAT YANG  
TERSENARAI DI PASARAN SAHAM THAILAND (SET) 
 
ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini menyelidik sama ada Lembaga Pengarah dan struktur pemilikan 
mempengaruhi indeks penzahiran sukarela dalam laporan tahunan 317 syarikat bukan 
kewangan yang tersenarai di SET tahun 2004. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa 
tahap penzahiran sukarela dipengaruhi oleh kualiti lembaga pengarah dan struktur 
pemilikan syarikat. Semakin tinggi kualiti lembaga pengarah, semakin tinggi juga tahap 
penzahiran sukarela. Tambahan lagi, hubungan ini nampak lebih lemah untuk syarikat 
yang mempunyai tahap penumpuan pemilikan ketua pegawai eksekutif (CEO) yang 
tinggi berbanding dengan penumpuan pemilikan CEO yang rendah. Kewujudan setiap 
satu indeks kualiti bagi setiap ahli lembaga pengarah, seperti kewujudan pemisahan 
Pengerusi Lembaga-pengarah urusan, perkadaran pengarah bukan-eksekutif yang 
bebas sebagai ahli lembaga, kewujudan jabatan audit dalaman syarikat, pengarah 
bukan-eksekutif yang bebas yang merupakan pengerusi jawatankuasa audit, bilangan 
bukan-eksekutif yang bebas dalam jawatankuasa audit, perkadaran kehadiran ke 
semua ahli jawatankuasa audit setahun berdasarkan jumlah mesyuarat jawatankuasa 
audit, jumlah ahli jawatankuasa audit yang merupakan pakar kewangan, seorang 
pengarah bukan-eksekutif yang bebas yang merupakan pengerusi jawatankuasa 
ganjaran, dan perkadaran pengarah bukan eksekutif dalam jawatankuasa ganjaran 
adalah faktor signifikan berhubungan dengan indeks penzahiran sukarela. Hasil 
dapatan ini menunjukkan hubungan di antara Ahli Lembaga Pengarah dan indeks 
penzahiran sukarela tidak semestinya sama di antara pemegang saham utama 
(disederhana secara positif dan negatif) dan pengurusan (disederhana secara negatif), 
antara pemegang saham utama yang bukan sebahagian daripada pengurusan 
 xv
(disederhana secara positif) dan merupakan ahli keluarga (disederhana secara negatif), 
dan antara penumpuan pemilikan CEO yang tinggi (disederhana secara negatif) dan 
penumpuan pemilikan CEO yang rendah (disederhana secara positif). Akhir sekali, 
pembolehubah kawalan terdiri daripada saiz syarikat, jenis pengaudit, dan pulangan 
pendapatan didapati mempunyai pengaruh signifikan terhadap tahap penzahiran 
sukarela.  
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THE QUALITY OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
LEVEL OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN THAILAND 
ABSTRACT  
This study investigates whether the quality of board of directors (i.e. each dimension 
and level of the board of directors’ quality) and the ownership structure influence the 
voluntary disclosure index in the annual reports of 317 non-financial companies listed 
on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2004. The findings suggest that the voluntary 
disclosure index is influenced by the quality of board of directors and the ownership 
structure of the firm. The higher the board of directors’ quality index, the higher is the 
voluntary disclosure index. Each dimension of board of directors’ quality, namely, 
proxied by chairman-CEO separation, proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board, existence of internal audit department, an independent non-
executive director who is an audit committee chairman, number of independent non-
executive directors on audit committee, proportion of all audit committee members’ 
attendance per year on total meetings of audit committee, number of audit committee 
members who are financial experts, an independent non-executive director who is a 
remuneration committee chairman, and the proportion of non-executive directors on 
remuneration committee, are significant factors associated with the voluntary disclosure 
index. These results show the relationship between the quality of board of directors and 
voluntary disclosure index will not necessarily be the same between companies with 
major shareholder owners (positively and negatively moderate) and those with 
managerial owners (negatively moderate), between companies with major shareholders 
who are not part of management (positively moderate) and those with family members 
(negatively moderate), and between companies with high concentration (negatively 
moderate) and those with low concentration (positively moderate) of CEO controlling 
ownership. Finally, control variables comprising company size, auditor type, and 
earnings return were found to have a significant influence on voluntary disclosure index. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
Disclosure is the process through which an entity communicates with the 
outside world. The significance of proper and adequate corporate disclosure cannot be 
over emphasized in a free economy where the market allocates the resources to 
different sectors of the economy. Baumol (1965) reported that the lack of adequate 
disclosure can create ignorance in the securities market and can result in misallocation 
of resources in the economy (Chandra, 1974).  
This study focused solely on the disclosure found in the annual reports. It does 
not attempt to assess the quality of such disclosures or to identify incorrect or 
fraudulent disclosures. Other types of company disclosures exist and sources such as 
company websites and quarterly or half-yearly reports may provide useful information. 
However, this study focuses on annual report disclosures because they are the most 
important source of financial information to those outside a company (e.g. Botosan, 
1997; Knutson, 1992; and Lang & Lungholm, 1993) and potentially facilitate 
comparable analysis.   
There are two streams of disclosure literature, namely voluntary disclosure and 
mandatory disclosure. Voluntary disclosure can be defined as “disclosures in excess of 
requirements, representing free choices on the part of company managements to 
provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of 
users of their annual reports” (Meek et al., 1995, p.555). Mandatory disclosure refers to 
compliance with compulsory standards. If a disclosure item is mandatory, the 
assumption often made is that the item will definitely be disclosed; otherwise, the firm 
will receive a qualified audit report or some other regulatory sanctions. For that to 
happen standards must be rigorously enforced but in some countries, they are not. 
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Therefore, the adoption of high quality standards such as the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) is one vital step, but it is not a sufficient condition for improved 
transparency (Ball et al., 2003).  
Disclosure of information in the annual reports of companies is management’s 
attempt to reduce information asymmetry. Investors would be able to make use of the 
information disclosed for decision making and for other investing activities. When 
management discloses more information than is mandated by law, it means that they 
are disclosing voluntary rather than mandatory information. Voluntary disclosure does 
provide useful information for investment purposes (Balachandran & Bliss, 2004).  
Most of the research on voluntary disclosure to date has been conducted in the 
UK, the US, and Continental European countries (e.g. Adams & Hossain, 1998; Buzby, 
1975; Cerf, 1961; Cooke, 1989; Depoers, 2000; Firth, 1979; Hossain et al., 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Malone et al., 1993; McKinnon & Dalimunthe, 1993; McNally et al., 
1982; Raffournier, 1995; and Singhvi & Desai, 1971). Only a few studies (e.g. 
Balachandran & Bliss, 2004; Chau & Gray, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Hossain et al., 1994; and Rahman, 1998) have been conducted in Asian 
countries. 
This study aims to examine the voluntary disclosure behavior of companies that 
are registered in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). The SET has been 
categorized as an Emerging Capital Market or ECM, which is similar to the stock 
exchange in developing countries (Saudagaran & Diga, 1997).  There are four reasons 
why the study of voluntary disclosure would prove to be significant in Thailand. 
The first reason is because there is evidence that there is a low level of 
voluntary disclosure in Thailand. A study conducted by Center for International 
Financial Analysis & Research or CIFAR (1995) compared a point average  of the 
information disclosure of the registered companies in an industrial group from 39 
countries that consisted of the developed capital markets  and the emerging capital 
markets. The study showed that countries in the emerging capital markets disclose less 
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information than countries in the developed capital markets. Table 1.1 provides the 
ranking of information disclosed in 39 countries comprising 17 emerging and 22 
developed capital markets.   
 
Table 1.1 
Disclosure levels of industrial companies in selected ECMs and developed capital 
markets 
 
Rank 
 
Country 
Average 
Score of 
Disclosure 
1 United Kingdom 85 
2 Finland, Sweden 83 
3 Ireland 81 
4 Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland 80 
5 Malaysia*, Singapore, South Africa* 79 
6 Chile*, France 78 
7 USA 76 
8 Canada, Denmark, Norway 75 
9 Israel, Netherlands, Sri Lanka* 74 
10 Hong Kong, Pakistan* 73 
11 Spain, Zimbabwe* 72 
12 Japan, Mexico* 71 
13 Nigeria* 70 
14 Argentina*, Belgium, South Korea* 68 
15 Germany 67 
16 Italy, Thailand* 66 
17 Philippines* 64 
18 Austria 62 
19 Greece*, India* 61 
20 Colombia*, Taiwan*, Turkey* 58 
 
* Emerging Capital Markets (ECMs) 
 
Source: CIFAR (1995), as cited in Saudagaran and Diga (1997) 
 
In Table 1.1, six countries of the emerging capital markets are in the first 10, 
namely, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Chile, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. In contrast, 
nine countries are in the last five ranks. Thailand is ranked as number 16; the same 
level as Italy.  
 The ranking by CIFAR (1995) was based on 85 items. The items consisted of 
67 items of mandatory disclosure and 18 items of voluntary disclosure.   In Thailand, the 
Thai Accounting Standards or  TAS provided the mandatory disclosure and any 
disclosure in addition to the mandatory disclosure is considered as voluntary. There is 
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not much difference between TAS and the International Accounting Standards or IAS. 
Toplin et al. (2002) conducted a study on the mandatory disclosure based on a sample 
of 60 companies in Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. It was found that the average level of mandatory disclosure of the sampled 
group is 95.5 percent, which was considered high.  Interestingly it was found that the 
mandatory disclosure for Philippines and Thailand was much higher than Australia, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and countries with British colonial links. This study 
differs from the CIFAR’s (1995) study because CIFAR’s list comprise majority of 
mandatory items as compared to voluntary items. It implies that in terms of mandatory 
disclosure, Thailand ranks high but it might not be the case for voluntary disclosure.  
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 has led to the realization that greater 
adequate disclosure of company was essential to protect investors’ interest 
(Balachandran & Bliss, 2004). This led to the second reason why the study should be 
conducted. The lack of good corporate governance and lack of adequate disclosure 
and transparency by Thai listed companies on the SET resulted in a loss of investor’s 
confidence (Paweewun, 2003). Trairatvorakul (1998) reported that adequate disclosure 
and transparency is a key to promote investors’ confidence and market efficiency. He 
suggested that SET should require listed companies to disclose both financial and non-
financial information in their annual reports. Since January 1998, the SET has required 
listed companies to set up an audit committee comprising at least three members to 
review the company’s annual report to “ensure accuracy and adequate disclosure” 
(SET, 1999a, p. 7). This requirement is encapsulated in the Best Practice Guidelines 
for Audit Committee (SET, 1999a). 
According to McKinsey & Company Investor Opinion Survey (2000) investors 
do not mind paying a 25.7 percent premium for Thai listed companies that comply with 
the principles of good corporate governance. In addition, the McKinsey & Company 
Investor Opinion Survey (2000) found that although there was a significant 
improvement in the principles of good corporate governance, but their corporate 
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information disclosure and transparency, equal treatment for both major and minor 
shareholders, and the role of stakeholders, needed to be improved.  
The third reason for why this study should be undertaken is the unique feature 
found in Thai companies which is not found in other countries. Most Thai companies 
are usually run by Chinese family members and is thus based on the Chinese family 
values. This value allows one to only disclose information that is necessary as 
disclosing more information would be considered as revealing the “family secret”. This 
practice is supported by Jelatianranat’s (2000)’ study while Gray (1988) and 
Radebaugh and Gray (1997)  confirmed this finding and concluded that in Asian 
environment the culture of the countries will shape the practice of the companies. Ball 
et al.’s (2003) recommended that companies in the Asia should be encouraged to 
disclose more voluntary information as for the benefit of their investors and users of the 
financial statements. 
 The fourth and final reason as to why the study should be undertaken is based 
on the study by Limpaphayom (2000). This study found that the management and the 
ownership structure of a company will influence the information disclosed. 
Wiwattanakantang (2000) found that companies registered in Thailand - in addition to 
being controlled by the family system - usually their top management owns the largest 
shares. Top management and the first largest shareholder often one and the same 
person and this therefore indicate the presence of managerial ownership.  
Previous studies have examined some corporate governance mechanisms that 
may influence voluntary disclosure practice (e.g. Balachandran & Bliss, 2004; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Evans, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ho & Wong, 2001; and Willekens et 
al., 2004). However, the studies examined the effect of the corporate governance 
mechanisms such as board of directors, audit committee, remuneration committee, etc 
individually and did not examine the effect of the corporate governance mechanisms in 
aggregate characteristics. This study will only be focusing only on one corporate 
governance mechanism, namely the board of directors. This study will also be 
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developing an index to measure the quality of the board of directors. To date, this is the 
first study that will be using an index to measure the quality of the board of directors. 
The reason why only the board of directors is studied is because the board of directors 
acts as the top management of the company and has the final say in all decisions that 
will be made by the company. 
 The main objective of this study is therefore to examine the relationship 
between the level of the board of directors’ quality with the level of voluntary disclosure 
of listed companies in Thailand. Under the implicit assumption of Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) positive agency theory, the study hypothesized that an improved 
quality of the board of directors would lead to more voluntary disclosure practices. The 
index of the quality of the board of directors developed for this study can be adapted to 
other countries or economies with similar institutional backgrounds as the Emerging 
Capital Markets (ECMs)1.  
 The board of directors of the companies is chosen as it is an important tool to 
protect shareholders’ assets and to control the management of the company.   The 
board of directors is also the main policy making body, strategic planner, and acts as 
the authority of the company. In Thailand, the board of directors of most the listed 
                                                 
1 ECMs are made up of 47 countries (IFC, 1994, as cited in Saudagaran & Diga, 1997). 
comprising 14 countries in Africa i.e. Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, and Zimbabwe; 11 countries in Asia i.e. Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand; 5 countries in 
Europe i.e. Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey; 13 countries in Latin 
America i.e. Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; and 4 countries in the 
Middle East i.e. Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. 
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companies on the SET are controlled by the largest shareholders. As a result of this, 
the interests and participation of the minority shareholders are being undermined 
(Limpaphayom, 2000).  An important tool for the protection of the minority shareholders 
is the ownership structure in the companies. Generally, the ownership structure of the 
top five largest shareholders in the company from 1990 to 1998 and 2003 shows an 
increasing trend. Please refer to Table 1.2 for details. 
 
Table 1.2 
Top Five Ownership Concentration for Public Companies Limited 
(Unit: percent of total outstanding shares) 
Largest 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 
First 26.18 26.35 26.79 32.28 26.36 27.66 28.05 28.50 28.86 35.58
Second 11.44 11.43 10.99 16.52 10.67 11.26 11.69 11.70 12.07 14.47
Third 6.61 6.80 7.08 9.89 6.89 6.99 7.12 7.35 7.27 7.72 
Fourth 4.93 5.00 5.18 6.39 4.85 5.00 5.06 5.12 5.18 4.83 
Fifth 3.85 3.91 3.98 4.57 3.85 3.91 3.88 4.07 4.18 3.30 
Top 
Five 
53.01 53.49 54.02 69.65 52.62 54.82 55.80 56.74 57.56 65.90
 
Source: 1990-1998, as cited in Limpaphayom (2000), and 2003 from the report on the 
disclosure of additional information (Form 56-1) and annual reports (Form 56-2) of all 
Thai public limited companies in the SET 
 
 Although the Public Company Act of 1992 and The Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1992 permitted shareholders to hold a minimum proportion of shareholdings per 
person but in practice this could not be enforced. This was because the large 
shareholders were family’ members or are the management of the company.  As a 
result there was minimal legal protection for minority shareholders. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 The study by CIFAR (1995) ranked Thailand as number 16 from 20 which 
showed that the information disclosed in the annual reports of Thai companies was not 
adequately disclosed. Standard & Poor and the National University of Singapore (S&P 
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& CGFRC, 2004) in their studies recommended that Thai listed companies had to 
improve transparency and provide more information disclosure.  
 Thai listed companies were mostly controlled by family members, the CEO and 
the CFO who were large shareholders or representatives of large shareholders. In 
addition, Wiwattanakantang (2000) stated that most listed companies in the SET were 
controlled by a few large shareholders and the percentages of total share were also 
high. Minority shareholders held a small percentage of shares and thus had less 
influence to control and make decisions about the administration. Consequently, Thai 
listed companies do not prefer to disclose the information as investors in the stock 
exchange expected (Jelatianranat, 2000). 
 From the problem above, the important element to be present in the company 
that could lead to a better transparency in the annual report is the board of directors’ 
quality. Levitt (1999) found that, when corporate governance was not good, there is a 
lower level of transparency in the annual report, profit manipulation, and there is a 
weakness in internal control. One of the recommendations made by Levitt to overcome 
this problem was to have the board of directors’ quality for ensuring the integrity of 
financial reports.  
 Previous research examining board of directors’ characteristics have studied 
the following dimensions: (1) the board’s leadership structure (e.g. Evans, 2004), (2) 
board’s composition (e.g. Vafeas, 1999; and Willekens et al., 2004), (3) board’s 
meetings (e.g. Evans, 2004; and Vafeas, 1999), (4) board’s controlling system and 
internal audit (e.g. Willekens et al., 2004) and (5) board’s committees such as audit 
committee. Pertaining audit committee characteristics, the following dimensions were 
examined in previous research (1) audit committee’s leadership structure (e.g. Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002), (2) audit committee’s composition (e.g. Ho & Wong, 2001; and 
Willekens et al., 2004), (3) audit committee’s meetings (e.g. Evans, 2004; and Liu, 
2004  and (4) audit committee’s knowledge and expertise (e.g. Mangena & Pike, )
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2005 . Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) ) have examined 
another committee set up by board of directors, that is the remuneration committee. 
Dimensions of the remuneration committee examined were (1) leadership structure 
(e.g. Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) and (2) composition (e.g. Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998 . )
 In Thailand, there have not been many researches examining the relationship 
between the quality of the board of directors and the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of listed companies in the SET. SET emphasized the role of the board 
of directors, the audit committee  and the remuneration committee, to ensure that the 
annual financial reports of the company is reliable and ensure that there is disclosure of 
information that would prove beneficial to the users of the financial statements. 
However, it should be noted that even with quality board of directors overseeing 
that there is transparency in the annual reports, this could still not be achieved. As 
discussed earlier, Thai listed companies are usually owned by family members of the 
company and also by the five largest shareholders of the company. As such, this may 
not be possible under very high ownership concentration, large shareholders who have 
access to corporate information are less motivated to disclose private information to 
external shareholders. The result is weak overall corporate governance and inadequate 
protection of small shareholders’ rights. Thus this study introduces ownership structure 
as the moderator variable which could influence the relationship of the quality of the 
board of directors to level of voluntary disclosure of the annual reports of the 
companies. 
Thus, this study aims to investigate the influence of the board of directors’ 
quality, on the level of voluntary disclosure of listed companies in Thailand. In addition, 
it aims to ascertain the role of ownership structure as a moderator variable on the 
relationship between the board of directors’ quality and the level of voluntary disclosure 
of listed companies in Thailand. 
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1.3 Research questions  
On the basis of the research background, this study will be guided by seven 
major research questions: 
(1) What is the level of the board of directors’ quality of Thai listed companies?  
(2) What are the dimensions of the construct referred to as “board of directors’ 
quality” (i.e. the quality of the board’s leadership structure, composition, meetings, 
controlling system, committees, audit committee and remuneration committee) of 
Thailand’s listed companies?  
(3) What is the level of voluntary disclosure of Thailand’s listed companies? 
(4) What is the relationship between the level of the board of directors’ quality 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in Thailand’s listed companies? 
(5) What is the relationship between each dimension of the board of directors’ 
quality (i.e. the quality of the board’s leadership structure, composition, meetings, 
controlling system, committees, the audit committee and the remuneration committee) 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in Thailand’s listed companies? 
(6) What is the effect of ownership structure on the relationship between the 
level of the board of directors’ quality and the level of voluntary disclosure in Thailand’s 
listed companies? 
(7) What is the effect of ownership structure on the relationship between each 
dimension of the board of directors’ quality (i.e. the quality of board’s leadership 
structure, composition, meetings, controlling system, committees, audit committee and 
remuneration committee) and the level of voluntary disclosure in Thailand’s listed 
companies?   
 
1.4 Research objectives 
This study will present empirical evidence that relationships exist and will 
among the board of directors’ quality, the level of voluntary disclosure and ownership 
structure. The objectives of this study are: 
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(1) To determine the level of the board of directors’ quality which is associated 
with the quality of the board’s leadership structure, composition, meetings, controlling 
system, committees, the audit committee and the remuneration committee in 
compliance with SET’s Code of Best Practice for Directors of Listed Companies, Best 
Practice Guidelines for Audit Committee, and the Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance of the Thai listed companies.  
(2) To determine each dimension of the board of directors’ quality which is 
associated with the quality of the board’s leadership structure, composition, meetings, 
controlling system, committees, the audit committee and the remuneration committee 
of the Thai listed companies.  
(3) To determine the level of voluntary disclosure of all information in the 
corporate annual reports of the Thai listed companies. 
(4) To determine the relationship between the level of the board of directors’ 
quality and the level of voluntary disclosure of the Thai listed companies. 
(5) To determine the relationship between each dimension of the board of 
directors’ quality which is associated with the quality of the board’s leadership 
structure, composition, meetings, controlling system, committees, audit committee and 
remuneration committee and the level of voluntary disclosure of the Thai listed 
companies. 
(6) To determine whether the ownership structure moderates the relationship 
between the level of the board of directors’ quality and the level of voluntary disclosure 
of the Thai listed companies. 
(7) To determine whether the ownership structure moderates the relationship 
between each dimension of the board of directors’ quality and the level of voluntary 
disclosure of the Thai listed companies.  
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1.5 Significance of the study 
1.5.1 Theoretical  
Eisenhardt (1989, p.59) argued that the agency theory has developed into 
positive agency theory which “the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting 
goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the agent's self-
serving behavior”. 
Under the implicit assumption of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) positive agency 
theory, the study hypothesized that an improved quality of the board of directors would 
lead to better governance that enhances more voluntary disclosure practices, and that 
voluntary disclosure practices are used as a means to reduce information asymmetry 
(e.g. Petersen & Plenborg, 2006) and agency problems. 
Leftwich et al. (1981) argued that the larger the proportion of independent 
directors on the board, the more effective it will be in monitoring managerial 
opportunism, and thus firms whose boards are dominated by outside directors are 
expected to disclose more voluntary information. 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) indicated that a higher proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the board should result in more voluntary corporate 
disclosure. They have suggested that once the firm’s capital is widely held, the 
potential of conflicts between principal and agent is greater than in family-controlled 
firms. To reduce these conflicts some shareholders, especially institutional ones, force 
managers to disclose more corporate information for the accurate evaluation of the 
firm’s performance. As a result, information disclosure is likely to be more intensive in 
widely held firms.  
The prevalence of family-controlled firms listed on a stock exchange, which is 
the case in the SET, may result in less demand for corporate disclosures (Dhnadirek 
and Tang, 2003). Furthermore, Wiwattanakantung (2000) found that Thai listed 
companies’ ownership is highly concentrated and most of the shares are owned by 
executive directors. As a result, managers and owners are of the same person. 
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Consequently, “ownership is highly concentrated, the nature of the agency problem 
shifts away from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling 
owner and minority shareholders” (e.g. Berle & Means, 1932 and Fan & Wong, 2002 as 
cited in Hope, 2003, p.10). It is important, then, to investigate whether controlled firms 
and family ownership are associated with lower incentives of independent directors for 
voluntary earnings disclosures.  
It is difficult or expensive for the minority shareholders to verify what the 
controlling owner is actually doing with independent directors. Thus, the theoretical 
contribution of this study extends the positive agency theory to include ownership 
structure as moderator variables.  
Ownership structure has often been considered as an independent variable that 
influences the level of voluntary disclosure in previous research. In this study, the role 
of ownership structure as moderator variable is investigated as appose to its role as 
independent variable as in previous research. This is an additional contribution to the 
positive agency theory. Ownership structure has been treated as moderator variables 
in this study as previous studies (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; and Forker, 1992) have shown 
that the quality of board of directors in the firms with managerial and family controlling 
ownership may become impaired and their influence on the disclosure quality of a 
firm’s financial reporting may be weaker than in firms without managerial and family 
controlling ownership. In addition, Hill (1999, p. 1127) argues that the role of 
managerial and family controlling ownership should be examined when corporate 
governance studies are undertaken as findings in corporate governance studies are not 
consistent.  
 
1.5.2 Practical  
The practical contribution of this study will assist the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) to understand the level of voluntary disclosure. The determining factor 
is the board of directors’ characteristics that influence the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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The SET can then monitor the board of directors’ characteristics that influence the level 
of voluntary disclosure in its quest for improved the transparency and the accountability 
of the corporate annual reports of the companies listed on the SET.  
 
1.6 Definition of key terms 
For the purpose of this study, the following terms will be utilized: 
 
1.6.1 The quality of the board of directors  
 The quality of the board of directors in this study includes the dimensions of (1) 
the quality of the board of directors’ leadership, (2) its composition, (3) meetings, (4) 
the controlling system, (5) the committees, (6) the audit committee and (7) the 
remuneration committee. The criteria are obtained from the SET’s Code of Best 
Practice for Directors of Listed Companies (SET, 1999b), Best Practice Guidelines for 
Audit Committees (SET, 1999a), and the Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
(SET, 2001). Board of directors’ quality are measured based on eleven dimensions and 
eleven items. Description of the dimensions and items are as follows:   
 
1.6.1.1 Quality of board 
  The quality of board in this study includes five dimensions of (1) quality 
of board’s leadership structure measured by the existence of titles and authority of the 
board’s chairman and head of management team are clearly separated in compliance 
with No.9 of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance, (2) quality of board’s 
composition measured by more than half of the directors on the board are independent 
non-executive directors (INDs) in compliance with No.8 of the Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance. In addition, board’s composition in this study is referred to as 
the company committees should consist of members of the board of directors into one 
of three categories namely, (i) executive directors who are concerned with the 
administration or committees that are authorized to sign; (ii) non-executive directors 
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such as independent non-executive directors who are not placed in any position and 
are not authorized to sign and are independent from the largest shareholders, the 
management, and other concerned persons and are not own more than 0.5 percent of 
direct outstanding shares and outside non-executive directors (all those not included in 
executive directors and independent non-executive directors) are those members the 
board who did not have any position in the company and were not representatives of 
the largest shareholders but they might be the representatives of customers, suppliers, 
or the creditors, etc (SET, 1999b), (3) quality of board’s meetings measured by all 
directors are to attend every board meeting in compliance with No.11 of the Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance, (4) quality of board’s controlling system and internal 
audit measured by the existence of internal audit department in the company in 
compliance with No.13 of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance, and (5) quality 
of board’s committees measured by audit committee (AC) and remuneration committee 
(RC) are established in compliance with No.13 of the Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance. 
 
1.6.1.2 Quality of audit committee (AC) 
  The quality of audit committee in this study includes four dimensions of 
(1) quality of AC’s leadership structure measured by the existence of AC’s chairman is 
an IND in compliance with No.12 of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance, (2) 
quality of AC’s composition measured by at least three AC members are INDs in 
compliance with No. 3.1 of Best Practice Guidelines for Audit Committee, (3) quality of 
AC’s meetings measured by all AC members are to attend every AC meeting in 
compliance with No.11 of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance, and (4) quality 
of AC’s knowledge and expertise measured by at least one AC member is a financial 
reporting expert such as CPA in compliance with No. 3.3 of Best Practice Guidelines 
for Audit Committee. 
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1.6.1.3 Quality of remuneration committee (RC) 
            The quality of remuneration committee in this study includes two 
dimensions of (1) quality of RC’s leadership structure measured by the existence of 
RC’s chairman is an IND in compliance with No.12 of the Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and (2) quality of RC’s composition measured by more than half of the RC 
members are non-executive directors in compliance with No.12 of the Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance. 
 
1.6.2 A high concentration of CEO’s ownership 
A high concentration of CEO’s ownership is referred to as the percentage of 
shares held by a CEO and includes his family as a single unit; adapted from 
McClelland and Barker III (2004); transform recode by median of all sample companies, 
if more than median is high concentration and at most median is low concentration. 
 
1.6.3 The largest shareholder controlling ownership 
 The largest shareholder controlling ownership in this study is referred to as the 
percentage of direct ownership’ share held by the largest shareholder (the percentage 
of shares held by shareholders who have the same family name will be combined as a 
single unit). The definition of a controlling ownership is adopted from the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) and this has been used in Wiwattanakantang’s study 
(2000). In Thailand, the shareholder who controls at least 25 percent of outstanding 
shares will have adequate controlling rights on the firm’s management.  
 
1.6.4 The non-executive director, largest shareholder-controlling 
ownership  
The non-executive director, largest shareholder-controlling ownership is 
referred to as the percentage of direct ownership’s share, at least 25 percent of direct 
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outstanding shares, held by the largest shareholder who is non-executive director; 
adapted from Chen and Jaggi (2000). 
 
1.6.5 The family member, largest shareholder-controlling ownership 
The family member, largest shareholder-controlling ownership is referred to as 
the percentage of direct ownership share, at least 25 percent of direct outstanding 
shares held by the largest shareholder who is a family member; adapted from Chen 
and Jaggi (2000). 
 
1.6.6 Minority shareholders 
 Minority shareholders in this study are referred to as shareholders though larger 
in number, hold only a small portion of total shares. They have very little influence over 
management decision-making and control (Wiwattanakantang, 2000). 
 
1.6.7 Firm characteristics 
This study will control the firm characteristics. Three firm characteristics (1) 
performance variables, (2) structure variables, and (3) market variables will be 
controlled. These categories are based on Chen and Jaggi (2000), Lang and Lundholm 
(1993), and Wallace et al. (1994). 
The performance variables controlled in this study are: (1) profitability, defined 
as the ratio of income before extraordinary items (IBEX) over net sales (profit margin) 
and IBEX over book value of equity for the beginning of the period (earnings return); 
and (2) liquidity ratio, defined as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities.  
The structure variables controlled in this study are: (1) debt-equity ratio, defined 
as the ratio of long-term debt over book value of common equity; and (2) firm size, 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, net sales, and market capitalization. 
The market variables controlled in this study are: (1) scope of business 
operations, defined as conglomerate or non-conglomerate firms; and (2) type of audit 
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firm, defined as the Big4 international independent audit firms (i.e. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte and Touche, and KPMG). 
 
1.6.8 Voluntary disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure in this study are the external reporting done beyond what 
is mandated (Meek et al., 1995, p.555) and voluntary disclosure covers all data which 
concerns both the subsidiaries and the group itself (Depoers, 2000). The checklist of 
voluntary disclosure items in this study as a dependent variable comprising 70 items in 
annual reports of sample companies i.e. overall voluntary disclosure of general 
corporate information, corporate strategy, research and development (R&D), future 
prospects, employee information, social policy and value-added information, segment 
information, financial review, foreign currency information, and stock price information 
which was adopted from Meek et al. (1995) and Chau and Gray (2002). The scoring of 
voluntary disclosure items under the unweighted voluntary disclosure index was 
adopted from Cooke (1989). 
 
1.7 Organization of the thesis 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides the background, 
problem statement, research objectives, research questions, definitions of key terms, 
significance of the study, and the organization of the remaining chapters.  
Chapter 2 is divided into fourteen sections and comprises the background, the 
legal framework of the board of directors, the board of directors’ composition, roles and 
responsibilities of the directors, the collective responsibility of the directors, conflict of 
interest, appointments to the board of directors, holding a director’s position, directors’ 
remuneration, board of directors and shareholders’ meetings, directors’ reporting, 
relationship among members of the board of directors and relationship with investors. It 
ends with a summary of the chapter. 
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Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature, previous research, the theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses that are related to this study. The review presented 
includes the positive agency theory, voluntary disclosure, disclosure criteria and 
corporate governance mechanisms. This chapter also includes the theoretical 
framework and discusses the hypotheses of the study and the control variables. It ends 
with a chapter summary.  
Chapter 4 is divided into seven sections and comprises research design, 
measurement of variables of the study, population and sample of the study, data 
collection method, explanation of data analyses that will be taken and a summary of 
the chapter.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of the data analysis. Firstly, this chapter 
describes the sample. Secondly, it describes the demographic information of the 
sample in terms of level of board of directors’ quality, level of voluntary disclosure items, 
ownership structure’s demographic information, and firm characteristics’ demographic 
information. Thirdly, this chapter presents the analysis of the dependent variables, 
including goodness of measures using reliability analysis. Finally, the results of 
hypotheses testing are presented.  
Finally, Chapter 6 recapitulates the major findings of this study and discusses 
the interpretation of the results. The implications of the findings are also discussed, 
together with limitations and suggestions for future research. This chapter concludes by 
reference to the findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN THAILAND 
 
This chapter is divided into fourteen sections and comprises the background, 
the legal framework of the board of directors, the board of directors’ composition, roles 
and responsibilities of the directors, the collective responsibility of the directors, conflict 
of interest, appointments to the board of directors, holding a director’s position, 
directors’ remuneration, board of directors and shareholders’ meetings, directors’ 
reporting, relationship among members of the board of directors and relationship with 
investors. It ends with a summary of the chapter. 
 
2.1 Background 
 The Public Company Act of 1992 superseded the Public Limited Company Act 
of 1978. According to Limpaphayom (2000) the new act was established to overcome 
the shortfalls of the previous act. The Public Limited Company Act of 1978 did not allow 
having cumulative voting because this could lead to the frequent changes of the board 
of directors, which could cause disunity in the company administration. The law also 
forbade the largest shareholders to hold shares which are more than 50 percent of 
paid-up capital and forbade other shareholders to hold shares which are more than 10 
percent of paid-up capital. In addition, the law discouraged companies whose owners 
were family members to be listed companies on the SET. As a result of the new Public 
Company Act of 1992 the ownership structure of the five largest shareholders was 
increased from 50 to 70 percent of paid-up capital from 1990 to 1998 and 2003 
(Limpaphayom, 2000). There were also more companies listed on the SET as a result 
of the new Act. 
 To cater for the increase in companies listed on the SET, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) of Thailand and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
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have recommended some good principles for the board of directors of the listed 
companies (SET, 1999b) and for the audit committees (SET, 1999a) to effectively carry 
out their duties. One phenomenon that can be observed in Thai listed companies, 
according to Claessens et al. (2000) was that more than 60 percent of the listed 
companies were family-owned. Although over many years the family-owned style 
tended to decrease in some part, it still remained a significant portion. As a result of 
this family owned nature, there were lack of compliance with some of the principles 
suggested (SET, 2001). 
The Corporate Governance Center of the Stock Exchange of Thailand or the 
SET (SET, 2003) found that 98 percent of the listed companies were able to comply 
with the following principles: proxy of voting; the rights of the stakeholders; the 
protection of inside information; the remuneration of the directors and the management; 
and the audit committees. Three of the principles that were not complied with were: a 
written policy on corporate governance, having a remuneration committee, and an 
independent chairman of the board of directors. 
 
2.2 Legal framework of the board of directors 
 The Public Company Act (PCA) of 1992 allows public companies to have many 
directors but not less than five persons. To qualify as directors one (1) must be at least 
eighteen years of age; (2) must not be a bankrupt; (3) must not have been imprisoned 
for fraud or embezzlement; and (4) must not be removed from the government office 
for fraud. Additionally, the directors must not be the shareholders in the companies but 
could be the representatives of the major shareholders from various groups. 
 The Public Company Act of 1992 has defined the regulations for the 
appointment procedure, qualification, roles, duties, and the responsibility of the 
directors in a listed company. Besides, the directors would be selected by the 
shareholders in the annual meeting. In business, directors were required to work with 
care and honesty according to the law and regulations for the best benefit of the 
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companies. On the other hand, if the directors were found to have disobeyed the rules 
and regulations, they can be imprisoned or be asked to pay a fine. Generally, many 
listed companies established a code for their companies regarding the best 
principles/code of corporate governance and business ethics (Limpaphayom, 2000a). 
 Nikomborirak (2001) stated that shareholders are allowed to vote to determine 
who should be the director of the company in the annual general meeting. A holder of 
one share is allowed to cast one vote. In Thailand, cumulative preference shareholders 
are also allowed to vote. This is not in line with the practice in many Asian countries. 
The problem occurs from shares that had cumulative voting or which disregard the 
voting plan according to the regulations in the Public Company Act of 1992, that is, one 
share one vote; however, a few companies permitted cumulative voting. In Thailand, 
the term for a directorship is between 2 to 4 years. To stay compliant with the 
regulations, what happens in practice is that the companies will randomly select their 
directors and reappoint one third of them who are terminated each year. The Public 
Company Act of 1992 did not require independent directors to be board of directors of 
a company. However, in 1999, the SET introduce a new requirement which required 
that the board of directors of a listed company must comprise of at least two 
independent directors. The role of the independent directors was to ensure there was 
no biasness in decisions made by the board of directors and that the interests of 
minority shareholders were protected.  
 
2.3 Board of directors’ composition 
 The SET (1999b) requires the board of directors to comprise of the following: 
(1) directors who were involved with routine administration who have an authority to 
approve activities of the company; (2) non-administrative directors who were 
independent and did not hold any position in the administration or did not work as 
employees of the companies. They do not have an authority to approve activities of the 
company. They must also be independent from the large shareholders, the 
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management, and related parties persons. They should be able to look after the 
interest of the shareholders and should prevent any form of occurrence of conflict of 
interest; and (3) outside directors who did not hold any position in the administration 
and are not employees of the companies. They must not be the representative of large 
shareholders; nevertheless, they might be the representative of stakeholders such as 
customers, suppliers, or creditors. The proportion of independent board of directors 
should include number of independent non-executive directors more than the number 
of the outside non-executive directors adds to executive directors and at least three 
independent non-executive directors as audit committee members on the board. 
The directors are responsible to ensure that the financial and non-financial data 
are disclosed in the annual reports. The board of directors is considered as the highest 
decision making committee in a company. The board of directors should be able to 
voice out their opinions freely. The chairman of the board should be an independent 
director and should not be the same person as the managing director (SET, 1999b). 
 With respect to audit committee, SET (1999a) requires that every listed 
company must have at least three independent non-executive directors as audit 
committee members. Nikomborirak (2001) defines independent non-executive directors 
as follows: (1) must not be employees of the companies, subsidiaries, or 
conglomerates; (2) do not hold shares that are more than 0.5 percent of the paid-up 
capital of the company; and (3) do not have any benefit or interest, directly or indirectly 
in the company, its subsidiaries, or its conglomerates. 
 In a study conducted by SET (2003), it was found that 73 percent of the listed 
companies comply with the requirement of having at least three independent non-
executive directors in the board. Out of this percentage, it was found that 67 percent of 
the companies had at least three independent non-executive directors; while 31 
percent had four to 14 independent non-executive directors and two percent had less 
than three independent non-executive directors on their board. 
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SET (2003) analyzed the possible reasons for non-compliance, as follows: (1) a 
lot of directors in the board of directors did not understand the definition of the 
independent non-executive directors, (2) difficult to find independent non-executive 
directors to sit on the board, and (3) the companies did not want to incur further 
expense, especially the smaller companies to remunerate the independent board of 
directors.  
An interesting finding from the study has shown that although on average, the 
board size was 11 people and the smallest size was 5 people (which were the 
minimum requirement of the Public Limited Company Act 1992), the actual size of the 
board of directors could go to as high as 25 people. The textile and clothing sector had 
the largest board size with an average of 15 people.  
 
2.4 Roles and responsibilities of board of directors 
 The SET (1999b) has listed the roles and responsibilities of the board of 
directors. Directors are required to be competent, knowledgeable, and experienced to 
run a business. They must also have an interest to serve the company. In addition, 
they must be honest. Directors are to accept the resolutions of the shareholders’ 
meetings and must at all times look after the interest of the company. They are 
responsible to implement and monitor policies of the companies so that economic 
value and shareholders' wealth are maximized. Directors must manage the company 
according to the laws and regulations. They should also ensure an efficient and sound 
system of internal control and internal audit in the company. In carrying out their duties, 
directors might seek professional advice from outside parties for assistance at the 
company’s expense. A company secretary should be appointed to assist the directors 
in carrying out their duties. Finally, the directors should establish and implement a 
Code of Corporate Conduct and a Code of Ethics for the companies. 
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